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Abstract 
We model a firm’s choice as to the age composition of dismissed workers for 
different assumptions about the level of firing costs. We find that when the cost of 
firing is independent of age, a higher level of firing costs will induce firms to fire their 
younger workers while lower costs induce them to fire the older ones. A 
corresponding effect is not found in the age dimension of the hiring decision. It 
follows that job protection favours more senior workers even when the cost of firing 
is independent of age and seniority.  
 
Keywords: Age-structure, tenure, firing decisions, real options.  
JEL: E32, J23, J24, J54 
 
State-mandated redundancy payments were introduced in many European countries 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. These restrictions have been assigned some of 
the blame for the poor employment performance of many European countries. There 
are also implicit costs of firing workers in the absence of such laws. For example, 
firing decisions may disrupt production, necessitate the training of replacement 
workers, have negative morale effects or shorten the expected future tenure of 
remaining workers. The economic effect of such implicit costs may be not much 
different from those stemming from more explicit employment protection. A number 
of studies have attempted to estimate the extent to which the poor performance of 
European countries can be explained by formal employment-protection legislation. 
There is also a body of research that describes the effect of different macroeconomic 
variables, such as real interest rates and expected productivity growth rates, on the 
firing decision.1 However, the use of the representative agent framework prevents this 
research from illuminating some interesting insights. 
 We depart from the existing literature in modelling the firing decision by allowing 
for worker heterogeneity in terms of age. Various studies have documented how 
employment protection seems to be related to youth unemployment (see, amongst 
others, Scarpetta (1996)). Blanchard (2006) emphasises the magnitude of the youth 
                                                 
1 See, amongst others, Bentolila and Bertola (1990),  
unemployment problem in Europe. Bertola et al. (2002) describe the pattern of 
unemployment for different age groups for the OECD countries and find that high 
unemployment for the younger age group is particularly pronounced in the more 
unionised countries as well as in those having more employment protection. In 
particular, France, Italy and Spain experienced especially large declines in youth 
employment. Our goal is to discover to what extent redundancy payments – the size 
of which does not depend on workers’ age or expected tenure – nevertheless have a 
differential effect on the firing decision depending on workers’ expected tenure. By 
allowing workers to differ in terms of their age we can answer questions such as how 
firms reach a decision as to whether to dismiss a young or a more mature worker and 
how labour-market institutions such as employment protection affect this choice. 
We are not the first ones to address this question. Lazear and Freeman (1997) find 
that in a downturn the youngest and the oldest workers should be the first to be laid 
off because the young have not been given any firm-specific skills while the 
productivity of older workers has declined relative to their wages. Layard et al. (1991) 
find the wage-push factor to be stronger for young workers due to higher turnover 
making their unemployment rate higher. This is because high turnover makes the 
prospect of unemployment spells less threatening which then makes unions more 
aggressive. Employment-protection legislation is not a part of the story in either 
case.2  
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 amounts of uncertainty when the investment project is at least in 
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1. An option-valuation approach  
The option-valuation approach to investment has been popular since the semina
papers of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) on the pricing of stock 
options. These methods of valuing stocks can be easily applied to real options, whi
denote the option-like characteristics of investment opportunities. The decision to 
invest (or the decision to exercise real options) becomes important with the existenc
of uncertainty and sunk costs. McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that the requir
rate of return on investment in many large industrial projects can be more than 
doubled by moderate
partly irreversible.3 
 In most cases it is assumed that the real options are infinitely lived – the real-life 
investment opportunities are infinitely lived and never valueless (e.g. McDonald
 
2 Other reasons for age discrimination in firing involve the direct and indirect effects of pension 
schemes. Most pension schemes are defined-benefit schemes, making the benefits increase more 
rapidly as the age of retirement approaches since they are based on final salary at retirement. This 
makes employers want to lay off workers with a long tenure. A possible offsetting effect can be found 
in Orszag et al. (1999). Here old workers have a higher effort level because they have more to lose in 
the event of a dismissal.  
3 For an introduction, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
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Siegel; 1984, 1986). However, some research deals with the non-perpetual real 
options (e.g. Paddock, Siegel and Smith, 1988). But it has been claimed that it is 
not possible to solve such non-perpetual options analytically, making numerical 
methods essential.
often 
 
should 
e solved for analytically using standard 
chniques of partial differential equations. 
 
 determination is not described. The source of uncertainty is stochastic 
 Current profits, measured in units of output, are defin lo
4 Generally speaking, it is hard to solve for free-boundary time-
dependent real options. This is partly due to functions of time-dependent options
having a complicated shape, which may require several analytical functions for 
simulation. We will show in the case of real options that approximate analytical 
solutions do exist.5 The approximate solutions of non-perpetual real options 
share the same composite components as perpetual real options. The partial 
differential equation of non-perpetual real options can then be transformed into a 
convection-diffusion problem,6 which can b
te
 
2. Modelling the firing decision 
There is only one sector in our economy that uses labour as an input to produce a 
homogenous good. Since our focus is on labour demand, real wages are assumed to be
fixed and their
productivity.  
ed as fol ws,  
( ) ( ),, tttttt ICwNNgNg −−=Π θ          0<θ <1,                      (1)
where N denotes the number of employed workers, w is the real wage, g is a measure 
of productivity, I represents gross changes of employment due to hiring and hiring – 
positive I denotes hiring and negative I firing – and C deno
 
tes the total costs of hiring 
and firing,7 consisting of a fixed and variable component: 
                                                 
 The convex functional form of total adjustment costs is similar to the one used in physical capital 
(dis-) investment such as Abel and Eberly (1994), Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
4 One of the reasons for the non-existence of analytical solutions is that such options are similar to 
American stock options that can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date. It is well-known 
that American stock options can only be solved for using analytical approximations or numerical 
methods such as finite-difference methods. American call options with lump-sum dividends are an 
exception though in that their terminal and boundary conditions differ (see Roll, 1977; Geske, 1979; 
Whaley, 1981). The possible analytical solutions to partial differential equations vary greatly when 
boundary- and terminal (and/or initial) conditions change. Changes in such conditions can result in the 
non-existence of analytical solutions. The method used here is most similar to Barone-Adesi and 
Whaley (1987).  
5 ‘Approximate’ is in a sense that the solutions might not be complete, but still a good proxy for real 
solutions. 
6 In physics, convection is the movement of the substance by the movement of the medium. Combined 
with a diffusion problem, it will be like the diffusion of a moving wave. 
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When the firm hires (fires) workers, it pays a fixed cost ch (cf) and positive unit costs
of hiring (firing) which may be rising in the number of workers hired (fired), 
phI+1/2γhI2 (or −pfI+1/2γfI2), respectively. Note that −pfI > 0 for firing since I < 0 in
this case. The coefficients ch and cf denote the fixed costs whenever the firm
to hire or fire. These are usually related to advertising, the s
) 
 
 
 decides 
creening process, and so 
on
and the trade union’s cooperativeness. The parameters p  and p   refer the unit costs of 
hiring and firing respectively. The parameters γh a
; the fixed costs for firing are related to legal consultations, disputes about firing, 
h f
nd especially γf are also linked to 
labour market institution such as the strength of labour unions and unions 
consultations. All parameters in equation (2) are positive.  
The net employment changes for the firm are denoted by hiring/firing minus quits 
ss
s NIdN λ−= ,                                                    (3) 
ds
where λ  denotes the constant quit rate per unit time
lify the model,
iat t all worker e roductivity 
tric 
. It is assumed that each worker 
has a working life of T years. To simp  we assume that workers die 
immed ely after they retire and tha s hav  the same p
independent of their age. Moreover, it is assumed that g follows a geome
Brownian motion 
ss dsgdg ;sgdWση +=                                                 (4) 
dsdW ss ε=where sW  is a standard Wiener process; sε and  is a serially 
uncorrelated, normally distributed random variable with mean zero and a standard 
deviation of unity. Here η  is the drift parameter (the expe  growth rate of labcted our 
productivity) and σ  the variance parameter.  
 The firm maximises the following expected intertemporal profits, V, by choosing 
hiring/firing, tI , over time,  
( )[ ] ( )  (4), and (3) s.t.  ,,max ⎤⎢⎡ ==−−= ∫ −− tT tsttttI NggdseICwNNgEV ρθ ⎥⎦⎣ tt N     (5) 
where E[·] denotes the expectation operator given the information set availab
firm at period t, and ρ is the constant interest rate. Applying Ito’s Lemma and the 
principle of dynamic programming, the expected intertemporal value of the firm can 
be represented by solving the following Bellman equation: 
le to the 
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( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+++−+−−= tgggNtI
VVggVNIVICwNgNEV 22
2
1max σηδρ θ ,        (6) 
The first three terms in the square bracket represent the firm’s immediate profits at t 
after deducting the total wage bill and costs related to hiring and firing; the fourth 
term shows changes in the value of the firm due to fluctuations in N due to quitting or 
tonomous changes over time. 
 The boundary conditions for hiring an
by the following equations (see appendix A
hiring/firing; the fifth and sixth terms denote the impact of changes in g on V over 
time; and the final term shows the effect of au
d firing for equation (6) can be summarised 
) 
hhh cpHv γ2+==  for hiring thresholds,                               (7.1) 
( )fff cpFv γ2+−=−=  for firing thresholds,                            (7
where H denote ffective hiring-cost threshold, depending on the fixed costs, uni
costs and adjustment speed costs par iring; F is the effective firing-cost 
threshold; and NVv =  is the marginal inter-temporal value of profits with resp
workers. In the inaction area where HvF <<− the firm  nothing and the number 
of employees only falls due to quits. The magnitudes of H and F are pos
.2) 
s the e t 
ameters of h
ect to 
 does
itive 
functions of fixed costs ( )fhc  and the adjustment costs ( )fhγ . At the hiring (firing) 
thresholds, the firm would hire (fire) the following number of workers, 
hhcI γ2=  for hiring;                                           (8.1) 
ffcI γ2−=  for firing.                                     (8
As fixed costs increase, the firm chooses to hire/fire more employees so that total 
fit of hiring/firing outweighs the total cost. With lower values of 
     .2) 
bene fhγ the firm
would also hire/fire more
 
 workers. The inaction area is smaller for lower fhc  and 
h fγ  since the firm needs to pay lower fixed and adjustment costs for the same 
numbers of hires/fires.8  
                                                 
8 Note that with null fixed costs and adjustment costs, equations (7.1) and (7.2) are reduced to the same 
forms as in Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Their implicit assumption is that the intertemporal value of 
marginal employees, v, never deviates outside of the inaction area of  
fhpv ±= . 
A very small value of  γ guarantees that the firm can hire/fire a lot of employees (according to 
equations (3) and (8))  
⇒−= NIdtdN δ  ( ) tNfhfhcI Δ+±=Δ δγ2 . 
This makes v fall back into the inaction area of  
fhpv ±=  
 immediately for any given shocks for very small values of γ. 
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 The marginal intertemporal values of employees for the bou
hiring and firing, v, in equations (7.1) and (7.2) are subject to the following partial 
ndary conditions of 
differential equation as show, as shown in Appendix A,  
( ) tYYYY vvYYvwYv +++−=+ 222
1
σηλρ ,                                (9) 
where = θgNY . Y has a drift term ( )1−θ θληη −+= 1Y  for marginal labou
productivity.  
r 
YdWYdsdY Y ση += .                                            (10) 
Equation (9) is equivalent to the following intertemporal integral without 
.                                   (11) 
The partial differential equation of equation (9) relates the value of workers to the 
 Y at each point in time. The firm will hire a marginal 
worker if  
 
wh e 
the 
as a 
ues of hiring and firing workers become independent of time. It 
l ge. 
roblem now is to solve for v, which is the value of employing a marginal 
worker. The solution for v consists of the particula
enient particular solution  for ) can be obtained by inte
1) 
hiring/firing-related costs 
( ) ( ) ( )( )−+−T tsλρ∫ −= t s dsewYTtYv ;,
value of the stochastic variable
( ) HTtYv ≥;,  
and fire a marginal worker if  
h
( ) FTtYv f ≥− ;, ,
ere Th denotes T for the worker that the firm hires and Tf for the worker that th
firm fires. Th is different from Tf since hiring and firing decisions cannot happen at 
same time. 
The partial term with respect to time, vt, in equation (9) make the differential 
equation difficult to solve. A simple way to get around it without resorting to pure 
numerical methods would be to assume that the analytical solutions have the same 
components as the infinitely-lived case found in Bentolila and Bertola (1990). In this 
case, equation (9) becomes a second-order ordinary differential equation in Y and 
result the option val
fo lows that the options for hires and/or fires do not approach zero when workers a
One of the objectives of this paper is to correct for this and show how interesting 
implications arise. 
 The p
r integral and the general function. 
A conv  (9 grating (11) 
directly 
,bwaYv P −=                                                    (1
where ( )( )
, Pv ,
( ) ( )YtTYea ηλρηλρ −+−= −−+−1 , ( )( )( ) ( )λρλρ +−= −+− tTeb 1  and it is assumed 
that the denominator of the parameter a is positive. As T approaches infinity, the 
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particular solution becomes identical to the one in the perpetual setup. The smaller 
value of T yields smaller value of particular solutions, which echoes the intuit
old workers have a lower intertemporal value for the firm. 
 The firm takes into account the option value of hiring in the future. There is also 
the option to fir
ion that 
e the worker once he is employed. The two option values are 
measured by the general (or homogenous) solutions to equation (9). Now only 
focusing on the homogenous part of (9) and letting  be the value of
op
vG  the marginal 
tion, we get 
( ) GtGYYGYG vvYYvv ++=+ 222
1
σηλρ .                                (12)
The general solutions of (12) are equal to the value of the options to hire or f
marginal worker. When Y approaches zero, th G
Y     
ire the 
e value of the option to hire, , has to 
go to zero. Similarly, the firing option, 
Thus, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options have to satisfy the 
following boundary conditions respectiv
1) 
A special case of equation (12) is when w
 in equation (12) disappears and the values of the hiring- and firing options are (see 
Appendix B) 
.1) 
The unknown parameters of  and  are determined by
 Hv
G
Fv , is equal to zero when Y goes to infinity. 
ely, 
( ) 0;,lim
0
=
→
TtYvG
Y
 for the hiring option,                              (13.
( ) 0;,lim =TtYvG  for the firing option.                              (13.2) 
∞→Y
orkers live forever (T=∞). Thus, the term 
G
tv
1
10
βA=  for hiring option,                                 (14
2βYAv  for firing option.                                 (14.2) 
Yv H
20F =
1A 2A  the value-matching and 
smooth-pasting conditions and β is determined by equation (15).  
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2
=+−+− λρβηββσ Y .                                     (15) 
The general solutions to (12) are then given by the follo
C): 
) ,                                        (16.1) 
) ,                                      (16.2) 
wing equations (see Appendix 
( ) ( 11 1;, dNYATtYvGH β=
( );, TtYvGF
where A1 , A2 are unknown parameters, 
( 22 2 dNYA −= β
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+⎟⎞⎜⎛ −−±
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 22
2
21
2
2
1ln
and ( )
⎠⎝
2
, 
( ) ,21 22∫
∞−
−
=
d
dedN ϖπ ϖ  ( ) 10 ≤≤ dN , is the cumulative normal distribution 
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function. The general solutions, or the real options to hire/fire, have the components 
similar to the ones of financial options such as in Black and Scholes (1973) while 
l solutions 
 to use the general solutions to solve the optimal stopping problem of 
keeping its perpetual parts components. Such functional forms of genera
make it possible
hiring and firing. 
 Looking at the hiring- and firing options we find two separate cases: 
Case 1: T → ∞ 
It is easy to show that as T approaches infinity (workers live forever), the cumulative 
ctions of  and  become unity. This reduces the firing-  ( )1dN ( )2dN −distribution fun
and hiring options to the case of perpetual options. 
 
Case 2:  T → t 
>0, then =1 and =0 as T approaches t. If the marginal 
ainly focus on the hiring decision. The firing 
( )1dN ( )2dN − YlnIf
profitability is high enough, firms m
option approaches zero because this workers will retire very soon. 
 
 If Yln <0, then ( )1dN =0 and ( )2dN − =1 as T approaches zero. A small ( )tT −  
means that Y needs to be very small to reach the firing threshold. If the marginal
profitability is low, firms mainly consider the firing decision. Since the marginal 
worker’s T is very small when workers get fired, the possibility of re-hiring workers 
 
on. 
The decision as to hire or fire workers depends on his value as given by equations 
 (16.2). The definition of the firing- and hiring barriers; 
YF and YH, are then given by the value-matching and smooth-pasting c
 
   (16) 
(17) 
 cost of firing; we will 
back is almost zero. Therefore, the hiring option approaches zero. Note that the 
options of hiring and firing approach zero automatically if T approaches t since the 
marginal profits for hiring/firing, particular solutions, would be zero in this situati
 
(7.1), (7.2), (11), (16.1), and
onditions:  
Value-matching conditions 
( ) ( )12 ,;,,;, ATtYvHATtYvbwaY hHGHhHGFH +=+− ,                
( ) ( ) ( )21 ,;,,;, ATtYvFATtYvbwaY fFGFhFGHF +=+−− .                 
 
The left-hand side of (16) has the marginal benefit of hiring which includes the 
acquired firing option. The right-hand side has the marginal cost of hiring, which 
includes the sacrificed hiring option. Similarly for equation (17), the left-hand side 
has the marginal benefit and the right-hand side the marginal cost of firing. In our 
numerical solutions below apart from Figure 1 of the general case of hiring and firing, 
we will only include the sacrificed firing option as part of the
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not include the acquired hiring option as a benefit of firing. The reason is that firing 
workers is not going to alter a firm’s chances at filling a vacancy in the future if there 
are many (homogeneous) unemployed people to start with.  
There are four unknown variables, YH, YF, A1, and A2, in equations (16) and (17). 
ns follow to ensure the slopes before and after thresholds 
with respect to YH and YF are the same: 
 
Smooth-pasting conditions 
The smooth-pasting conditio
( ) ( )
0,;,,;, 12 =
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+
HH YY
h
H
G
H
h
H
G
F ATtYvATtYva ,                         (18) 
( ) ( ) 0,;,,;, 12 =
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+
hGfG
HF YY
where details of deriva
FHFF ATtYvATtYva ,                        (19) 
tions of various YvG ∂ are shown in Appendix D. 
 
∂
), (17), (18) and (19) are a non-linear systematic equations with four 
] and can be solved for numerically, once 
 Equations (16
unknown parameters [ 1 and , , , AYY FH 2 A
beta roots, 1β  and 2β , are obtained from equation (15).  
   
3. Hiring- and firing thresholds 
We will now calculate the firing thresholds on the basis of equations (16), (17), (18) 
and (19). We calculate the hiring and the firing thresholds for a fixed level of firing 
costs in the two-threshold case when both the hiring- and the firing thresholds are 
calculated simultaneously. Though, H and F depend on three different parameters – 
xed costs, unit costs, and adjustment speed-related costs of hiring and firing – we 
can show the aggregate effect of those by plotting firing thresholds against effective 
firing costs. This is shown in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1.The effect of age on the hiring- and firing thresholds with different effective
firing costs. Ages are equal to (65–Th/f). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10
η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, H = 0.083, and t=0. 
 
As the effective firing costs rise, the firm becomes more inclined to fire the younger 
among its workers. The reason is that part of the cost of firing workers is the 
sacrificed option of doing so in the future. This was shown in equation (17). This 
firing option is decreasing in both the level of the firing costs and in the worker’s age. 
For low levels of effective firing costs, the marginal cost of firing the young worke
is much higher than the cost of firing older ones for this reason. But at high firing 
costs, the difference is much smaller as the firing option is always very low – both for 
the young and the old workers. However, the marginal benefit of firing the young 
workers is always higher – that is for all levels of firing costs – because of their longer
remaining tenure. It follows that the firm would choose to fire the young workers fi
if firing costs are high – the val
 
, θ=0.7, 
rs 
 
rst 
ue of the firing option low – but at low firing costs it 
a h 
 We can explain the effect of F on firing options in mo
simplified case. Consider the firing-only scenario w
,                                        (20) 
 (21) 
m y choose to fire the older workers first since the marginal cost of doing so is muc
lower. Furthermore we find that firms always hire younger workers first no matter 
what level the firing costs are. 
re details in the following 
ith perpetual workers, the value-
matching and smooth conditions are as follows 
( ) 2 βF YAFbwaY +=−−
1
22
2 −
=
ββ FYAa ,                                                
where 22
β
FYA  represents the perpetual firing option as shown in (14.2). Equation (21) 
shows that the option to fire is a linear function of Y: 
2
F
2
22
ββ FYAaY = . Thus, if the 
firing threshold Y falls due to a direct increase of F, the option to fire would also 
decrease accordingly. Though the fall of the Y thresholds due to increase in F le
higher value of 2βFY , the parameter 2A  makes sure that the whole firing option fal
F increases. The firing option denotes the waiting values from postponing exerc
the option to fire workers. As the direct effective costs of firing F increase, the 
probability that the firm would fire the employees becomes smaller and thus the 
probability that Y would return the profitable value for the firm once the firing 
decision is made is smaller. Therefore, for a high value of F, the firm would not re
its decisions of firing, which implies th
ads to 
ls as 
ising 
gret 
at the value of waiting, that is the firing option, 
is less important to the firm. This relationship still holds numerically for workers who 
do not live forever and for the system of the general hiring/firing value-matching 
conditions of equations (16) and (17). 
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 In this sense, the difference between the option of firing a young and an old worker
becomes negligible for high F. This implies that with high firing costs, the firm tends 
to fire the young workers first in order to reduce its losses for a much longer perio
time than when the older workers are fired. However with low firing costs, the firm 
values the option to be able to f
 
d of 
ire the workers at a later date when more information 
se 
r 
sts of firing, be the first to go even 
 productivity is no lower than that of older workers. Firing a young worker is 
r worker since his/her expected tenure is longer. 
t 
h firing costs provide more protection to the older workers 
than to the younger ones. It follows that the age structure of the population affects the 
e 
e age 
g 
0s. For example, the employment-
pro
an 
d 
about the evolution of productivity is available. This option is worth more in the ca
of the young workers and hence the firm faces higher costs of firing the younge
workers on this account. As a consequence, the firm tends to fire the older ones first 
when the cost of firing is low. 
 Note the difference between our setup and that of Lazear and Freeman (1997). 
They claim that it is optimal to fire the younger workers because they are less 
productive since the (firm-specific) skill accumulation has not been completed. We 
find that they should also, if there are significant co
if their
more profitable than firing an olde
Note also, that these results do not depend on firing costs rising over tenure. All tha
is needed is a high and fixed level of firing costs.  
  
4. Macroeconomic implications 
We have found that hig
tightness of employment-protection legislation; the ageing of the workforce has th
same effect on the firing thresholds as an increase in the firing costs themselves. This 
has two implications.  
First, when assessing the nature of a country’s labour-market institutions one has 
to normalise for the age structure of the labour force. Two countries with similar 
legislation can nevertheless have different effective legislation in the sense that firms 
are more reluctant to fire workers in one of the countries. Second, changes in th
structure of the population over time may have important consequences. The maturin
of the baby-boom generation in Europe can be one explanation why a given set of 
institutions started to generate different labour-market performance in the 1980s and 
1990s from that of the 1950s, 1960s and 197
tection legislation already in place in France, Italy and Spain may have been less 
restrictive in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. We conclude that 
labour-market rigidity is a function of the age-structure of the population no less th
of the nature of labour-market institutions. 
There arises an interaction between the level of firing costs, on the one hand, an
the age of workers, on the other hand, in determining the level of productivity at 
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which firms start firing each worker. With low firing costs, the firing threshold is 
monotonically rising in age making the more mature workers to be the first to lose 
their jobs in a downturn. But as the level of firing costs rises and, the sign of this 
relationship changes and the threshold becomes monotonically falling in age making 
the young workers the first to go if labour demand falls. We show the case of different 
levels of firing costs in Figure 2.9 
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igure 3 below shows the firing thresholds as a function of age (expected future 
tenure) for both young (20 years) and old (60 years) workers who both will retire at 
age 65. The figure shows clearly that we fire old workers first with low F and then 
tend to fire the younger ones as F becomes high, as discussed in the previous section. 
 
                                                
 
Figure 2.The effect of age on the firing threshold with different firing 
costs. Age is equal to (65–Tf). Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, 
θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0. 
 
F
 
9 Note that the numerical results in Figures 2 & 3 are obtained by running the value-matching/smooth-
pasting conditions for firing thresholds only, with the assumption of null hiring options and no hiring 
decisions. As shown in Chen and Zoega (1999), this simplification doe not affect the qualitative results 
for firing thresholds when only discussing the effect of F. 
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Figure 3.The effect of firing costs on the firing threshold for two age 
groups. Other parameters: σ =0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, 
w=1, and t=0. 
 
5. A quick look at the data 
Following Nickell et al. (2005) we estimate an equation where the depe
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 average unemployment in 1983-1988 and 1989-1994 for 19 OECD countries.10 The 
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riables is as ted. W ote th ploym prote ) 
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4. T how the l  colu  
nemployment equations 
No action A e (15-19) a  
interaction term 
Age (15-24) as 
interaction term 
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explanatory variables include the un
ti , union density, unio overage, union 
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ation, 
sure of acti  labou -market po es, the verage 
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allow for any inte e age s ure o  popul  The and 
significance of all va  expec e n at em ent ction (epl
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Table 2. U
 inter  terms g s
Variable t Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient        t-ratio Coefficien t-ratio 
       
  constant   6.29 1.5 -7.82 -0.8 -26.50 -2.4 
my (89-94)   7.61 1.8 -6.54 -0.7 -24.29 -2.3 
 6.2 
 2.4 
 1.7 
  dum
  replace ratio   0.10 4.2  0.12  4.8   0.14 
  duration of benefits   0.70 2.1  0.58  1.7   0.71 
  union density   0.03 0.8  0.03  0.6   0.06 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to Stephen Nickell for providing us with the data.  
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  union coordination  -2.12 2.0 -2.21 -2.1  -2.74 -3.0 
  employer coordination  -3.77 4.2 -4.01 -4.5 
  labour market expenditures  -0.07 1.9 -0.10 -2.4  -0.11 
  Δinflation  -1.01 1.5 -1.45 -2.1  -1.47 
  union coverage   3.16 2.7  3.07  2.6   3.07 
  employment protection (epl)   0.49 0.7 -2.03 
  age (15-19)  -0.42 1.4  0.74 
 -4.29 -5.4 
-3.0 
-2.4 
 2.8 
-0.3 -34.92 -1.9 
 1.0   1.02  2.6 
 e   2.3 
-2.5 
  
 
 
 
 
 pl*age    1.09  0.5   3.62
  epl*age2 -0.07 -0.7  -0.09 
     
  observations: 38 R2 DW    
  period: 83-88 0.87  2.03    
  period: 89-94       0.49 1.73    
      
 
In the last two regressions, the effect of epl is significant and a function of the age 
structure. This function is shown in the following figure when we use the age group 
15-24. When the share of the labour force between 15 and 24 is less than 26
effect of the epl o
%, the 
n unemployment is positive – greater epl gives higher 
nemployment – while the converse is true when the share is higher than 26%. We 
en the effect of epl on unemployment is allowed to depend on the 
eversion – in addition to the rate of interest and workers’ 
quit rates. Here we have shown that one also has to control for the age-distribution of 
the workforce when testing for the effect of firing costs on employment or 
unemployment.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the effects of employment-protection legislation are likely 
to depend on the age structure of the population. Such legislation is most effective in 
deterring the dismissal of mature workers and, as a result, is more likely to lead firms 
to dismiss the younger ones. Our explanation is independent of the productivity- and 
wage profiles of workers and also independent of the type of pension schemes they 
have. The effect arises for the sole reason that the value of the firing option – that is a 
part of the marginal cost of firing – is decreasing in both the level of firing costs and 
in the age of the worker.  
u
conclude that wh
age structure of the labour force, its effect becomes significant. 
 Finally, our results have implications for any empirical work done to test the 
employment effects of firing costs such as Lazear (1990), Scarpetta (1996), 
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell (1998), DiTella and MacCulloch 
(1998) and Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005). In another paper (Chen and Zoega, 
1999) we have shown how the employment effects of employment protection depend 
on the nature of the stochastic process followed by productivity – trend growth, 
variance, degree of mean r
 
13
 
Appendix A: 
The first-order conditions for gross employment changes of equation (6) in the text 
are denoted by   
vIp fhfh =+± γ ,                                               (A1) 
where . By substituting (A1) back into the Bellman equation (6) in the text, we 
obtain the following two differential equations for hiring and firing decisions: 
NVv =
 
( )
tggg
h
h
h VVggVvN
pvcwNgNV +++−−+−−= 22
2
2
1
2
1
σηλ
γ
ρ θ ;         (A2) 
( )
tggg
f
f
f VVggVvN
pv
cwNgNV +++−
+
+−−= 22
2
2
1
2
1
σηλ
γ
ρ θ .        (A3) 
Due to fixed costs of hiring and firing, the firm would only hire/fire employees 
whenever the total benefits of hiring/firing are greater than corresponding total 
adjustments costs. Therefore, for hiring decisions ( , the benefits of hiring I 
employees, , must be greater than its total adjustment costs, 
)0≥I
Iv 2
2
1 IIpc hhh γ++ .  
0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++− IIpcIv hhh γ .                                      (A4) 
In case of firing (  in economic downturns, v is negative. Thus, the total benefits 
of firing 
)0≤I
I  employees is captured by ; while the total adjustment costs of firing are Iv
22MIpc fff γ+− . The firm would fire employees as long as the following 
equation is satisfied: 
0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−− IIpcIv fff γ .                                     (A5) 
Equations (A4) and (A5) can be simplified by using (A1): 
02 >≥
h
hcI
γ
 for hiring;                                          (A6) 
0
2
<−≤
f
fcI
γ
 for firing.                                         (A7) 
The boundaries of the inaction area are then represented by following equations:  
hhh cpv γ2+=  for hiring thresholds,                               (A8) 
fff cpv γ2−−=  for firing thresholds.                            (A9) 
Substituting (A8) and (A9) back into Bellman equations (A2) and (A3) gives the 
following differential equation for hiring and firing: 
tggg VVggVvNwNgNV +++−−=
22
2
1
σηλρ θ .                    (A10) 
We need to solve the boundaries of hiring and firing by (A8) and (A9). Thus, equation 
(A10) needs to be transformed into marginal intertemporal value of employees, v, by 
using the definitions , , ,  and  and 
differentiating both sides of equation (A10) with respect to N: 
NVv = Ngg Vv = Ntt Vv = NNN Vv = Ngggg Vv =
 
14
( ) tgggN vvggvNvwgNv +++−−=+ − 221 2
1
σηδθλρ θ .               (A11) 
Equation (A11) is equivalent to the following intertemporal without hiring and firing: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∫ −+−−=≡ T
t
ts
st dsewYTtYvTtYv
λρ;,;, ,                        (A12) 
where . To simplify equation (A11), we can use a new variable, 
, representing the marginal product of labour. By Ito’s Lemma, we have 
1−
=
θθgNY
1−θgN= θY
YdWYdsdY Y ση += ,                                           (A13) 
where ( )θληη −+= 1Y . And the corresponding Bellman equation to (A12) without 
hiring and hiring is denoted by 
( ) tYYYY vvYYvwYv +++−=+ 222
1
σηλρ .                      (A14) 
 
Appendix B: 
As workers live forever (T=∞), equation (12) in the text is reduced to 
( ) YYYY vYYvv 222
1
σηλρ +=+ .                                      (B1) 
(B1) is a homogenous equidimensional linear differential equation and is easily 
solvable. The solutions to (B1) are: 
21
210
ββ YAYAv += ,                                               (B2) 
where A1 and A2 are coefficients and β1 and β2 are the roots of the following 
characteristic equation,  
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2
=+−+− λρβηββσ Y ,                                   (B3) 
and β1 is positive and β2 is negative, 
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
221 >
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+−=
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ
ηβ YY ,                        (B4) 
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
222 <
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−−=
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ
ηβ YY .                        (B5) 
The hiring and firing solutions for  are 0v
1
1
βYAvH =  for hiring option,                                   (B6) 
2
2
βYAvF =  for firing option.                                   (B7) 
These are equations (14.1) and (14.2) in the text respectively. 
 
Appendix C: 
Derivation of Equations (16.1) and (16.2) 
 
We know that if workers are expected to have infinite lives, the hiring and firing 
options approach  and  respectively. Thus, the first guess for the 
solutions to equation (12) in the text would be 
1
1
βYA 22
βYA
( ) ( tYzYtYvG ,, β= ) .                                              (C1) 
Differentiating (C1) gives 
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Y
G
Y zYzYv
βββ += −1 , 
( ) YYYGYY zYzYzYv βββ βββ ++−= −− 12 21 , 
t
G
t zYv
β
= . 
Substituting into equation (12) in the text gives 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 021
2
1 22
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−+++++− βλρβηβββσ YzzYzzzYYzz tYYYYY  
or  
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 021
2
1 22
=+−+++++− zzYzzzYYzz tYYYYY λρβηβββσ . 
Rearranging gives 
( ) ( ) 022
2
11
2
1
22
222
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−+− tY
Y
YYY zYzzYz σσ
ηβσλρβηββσ .  (C2) 
The first terms in the first bracket are equal to zero automatically due to the 
characteristic equation of equation (B3) in Appendix B. With the assumption that the 
solutions of options have the same components as the ones with infinite maturity, βY , 
the functions, , then follow a Convection-Diffusion type partial differential 
equation:  
( tYz , )
022 22
2
=+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++ tY
Y
YY zYzzY σσ
ηβ .                                 (C3) 
It is time to get rid of the Y and Y2 terms. Let  
,yeY =      , − ∞ < < ∞y ,
2
1
2
1 22 τσσ −= Tt  
where T is a constant. Then we have 
,Yy Yzz =   and ,
2
YYYyy YzzYz += .2
1 2
tzz −=τσ  
Substituting into (C3) gives 
0
2
12 2 =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−++ τσ
ηβ zzz yYyy .                                   (C4)  
The boundary and conditions for options, equation (13.1) and (13.2) in the text 
become 
( ) 0, =∞− τz , for hiring options,                                   (C5.1) 
( ) 0, =∞ τz ,  for firing options.                                    (C5.2) 
Substituting the values of betas, 21  and ββ , of equations (B4) and (B5) in Appendix B 
into (C4) gives 
02 =−+ τα zzz yyy , for hiring options,                             (C6)  
02 =−− τα zzz yyy , for firing options,                             (C7)  
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
η
α
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
Y .  
 
Hiring options 
We can simplify (C6) by setting 
τα2+= yx , τ=τ . 
Note that τ  is the same as τ . To rewrite (C6) in terms of ( )τ,x  we use the chain rule 
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τττττ ατ zzzxzz xx +=+= 2 , 
xyxy zxzz == , and . xxyy zz =
Substituting into (C6) gives 
τzzxx = .                                                        (C8) 
 A new variable that depends only on x and τ  is often used to solve the above 
partial differential equation: 
τ
ξ x= ,                                                        (C9) 
so that ( ) ( )ξτ uxz =, . Differentiating shows that  
( )ξξ
ττ
'
2
1 uz −= , ( )ξ
τ
''1 uzxx = . 
Substituting into equation (C8) gives the following second-order ordinary differential 
equation: 
( ) 0'
2
1'' =+ uu ξξ ,  ∞<<∞− ξ ,                                  (C10) 
The boundary condition of (C5.1) becomes the following equation: 
( ) 0=∞−u , for hiring options,                                   (C11) 
 Separating the variables, (C10) becomes 
( ) 41 2' ξξ −= eBu , 
where  is unknown constant.  Integrating gives 1B
( ) 141 2 CdseBu s += ∫
∞−
−
ξ
ξ ,                                         (C12) 
where  is an unknown constant. Applying the boundary condition for hiring options 
(C11) gives 
1C
( ) 0lim 1 ==
−∞→
Cu ξξ . 
Substituting into (C12) gives  
( ) ∫
∞−
−
=
ξ
ξ dseBu s 41 2 . 
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that  
( ) ∫∫
∞−
−
∞−
−
==
2
2
1
2
2
1
22
2
12
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ ϖ
π
ϖξ deAdeBu .                     (C13) 
where π= 211 BA . Substituting (C13) into (C1) and using the facts of  ,
yeY =
( ) ( )τ ξuxz =, , 
τ
ξ x= , ,
2
1
2
1 22 τσσ −= Tt  τα2+= yx , and ττ =  gives the 
hiring options vH
G , 
( ) ( 11 1, dNYAtYvGH β= ) ,                                         (C14) 
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) ,
2
1 22∫
∞−
−
=
d
dedN ϖ
π
ϖ . 
 
Firing options 
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In a similar way, we can obtain the firing options. We can simplify (C7) by setting 
τα2−= yx  and τ=τ .  
τzzxx = .                                                      (C15) 
A new variable 
τ
ξ x=  is used to solve the above partial differential equation so that 
( ) ( )ξτ uxz =, .  Differentiating and substituting into (C15) gives the following simple 
second order ordinary differential equation: 
( ) 0'
2
1'' =+ uu ξξ ,   ∞<<∞− ξ . 
 Separating the variables, the above equation becomes 
( ) 42 2' ξξ −= eBu , 
where  is unknown constant. Integrating gives 2B
( ) 242 2 AdseBu s += ∫
∞−
−
ξ
ξ ,                                          (C16) 
where  is an unknown constant. The boundary condition of (C5.2) becomes the 
following equation: 
2A
( ) 0=∞u ,     for firing options,                                     (C17) 
Applying the boundary condition for hiring options (C16) gives 
( )
π
πξξ 202lim
2
222
ABABu −=⇒=+=
∞→
. 
Substituting the above relationship back into (C16) gives  
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= ∫
∞−
−
ξ
π
ξ dseAu s 42 22
11 . 
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that  
( ) ∫∫∫
−
∞−
−
∞
−
∞−
−
==⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
222
2
1
2
1
2
11
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ
ξ
ϖ ϖ
π
ϖ
π
ϖ
π
ξ deAdeAdeAu . 
Thus, the firing options vH
G  becomes 
( ) ( 22 2, dNYAtYvGF −= β ) ,                                      (C18) 
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−−
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) .
2
1 22∫
∞−
−
=
d
dedN ϖ
π
ϖ . 
 
Appendix D:  
Derivation of Equations for YvG ∂∂  
 
Differentiating hiring and firing options – defined by (16.1) and (16.2) –  with respect 
to Y gives 
( ) ( )111111 11 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
H βββ +=
∂
∂
− ,                                  (D1) 
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( ) ( 222122 22 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
F
−+−=
∂
∂
− βββ ) .                             (D2) 
Differentiation of the integral, N(d), involves a parameter. Such differentiation can be 
obtained by using Leibnitz’s rule. Suppose a function  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
∫=
xb
xa
dssxfx ,ϕ ,                                               (D3) 
where f is such that the integration cannot be effected analytically. Using calculus 
gives 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) (xaxaxfxbxbxfds
x
sxfx xx
xb
xa
x ,,
,
−+= ∫ ∂∂ϕ )
)
.                 (D4) 
Applying (D4) to the differentiation of and  gives ( )1dN ( 2dN −
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
=
−
−+−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
1 ,                                            (D5) 
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
−=−
−
−+−−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
2 .                                       (D6) 
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
η
α
+
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
Y . 
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